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Abstract: The war in Ukraine has refocused Western attention on
Russia and its ability to project power, particularly in terms of “hybrid warfare” through the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine. At the
same time, Russian military thinking—and actions—are rapidly
evolving. This article reflects on the increasingly prominent role of
conventional force, including the use of high intensity firepower, in
Russian war fighting capabilities, and advocates the need for a shift
in our conceptualization of Russian actions from hybrid warfare to
state mobilization.

S

ince Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014,
there has been much discussion of Russian aggression in its
neighborhood, Russian rearmament—even militarization—and a
newly robust and competitive foreign and security policy that threatens
both the international order and even the West itself. Much of this debate
has had the feel of a response to an unwelcome surprise: few had paid
attention to the Russian military since the end of the Cold War (with the
partial exception of its successful, but rather moderate performance in
the Russo-Georgia war in 2008), and few had predicted the intervention
of competent, disciplined and well-equipped Russian special forces in
Crimea in 2014.
In their haste to come to grips with what was going on in rather fast
moving circumstances, observers traced their way back through recent
history using the distorting light shed by hindsight. Some oft-cited
older speeches by Vladimir Putin were rediscovered and embellished
with other much less widely-known sources to suggest not only that
the Russian operation was long pre-planned, but that Moscow had
developed a new way of achieving its goals while avoiding direct armed
confrontation with the militarily superior West.
One of these less well-known sources was an article published under
the name of Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov in
the Russian newspaper Voenno-Promyshlenni Kurier in early 2013. Relying
heavily on this source, which some considered “prophetic” given the
events in February 2014, many Western commentators suggested the
Russian operation in Crimea (and subsequently in Eastern Ukraine) heralded the emergence of a new Russian form of “hybrid warfare,” reflected
in what has become known as the “Gerasimov doctrine,” the contours
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of which had been set out in that article.1 This supposedly new form
of war conferred numerous advantages on Moscow, observers argued,
since it heightened the sense of ambiguity in Russian actions, and provided Russian leadership with an asymmetric tool to undercut Western
advantages: since Moscow would be unable to win a conventional war
with the West, it seeks to challenge it in other ways. Furthermore, it fits
readily into Western debates about the increasing roles of special forces
and strategic communications in conflict.
Even as the situation in Ukraine evolved and Russia intervened in
the war in Syria, this discussion of “hybrid warfare” became the bedrock
of the wider public policy and media debate about Russian actions, particularly about potential further “hybrid” threats to NATO member
states, and about how NATO and the EU might respond to and deter
them. The terms remain a central aspect of the media and public policy
debate in NATO and its member states as they explore and try to grasp
Russian “ambiguous warfare.”
At the same time, while the term hybrid war offers some assistance
to understanding specific elements of Russian activity, it underplays
important aspects discussed by Gerasimov, and offers only a partial
view of evolving Russian activity, capabilities, and intentions. One result
is thinking about Russia has become increasingly abstract, not to say
artificial, as Western observers and officials have created an image of
Russian warfare that the Russians themselves do not recognize. Another
result is too many have overlooked the increasingly obvious role of conventional force in Russian military thinking.
This article suggests Western emphasis from 2014 to 2015 has been
on the hybrid aspect of warfare, and now that emphasis needs to shift
quickly to focus on warfare. In other words, while there are hybrid elements, attention should be re-balanced to include more concentration
on the Russian leadership’s development of its conventional warfighting
capacity, even on its preparation for the possibility of a major state-onstate war. Indeed, in order not to fall behind evolving Russian thinking
and capabilities, it is already time to supersede thinking about hybrid
warfare to reflect on Russian state mobilization.

Debating Russian Hybrid Warfare

The labels hybrid warfare and Gerasimov doctrine have spurred and
underpinned much discussion about the “Grey Zone” between war and
peace, and Russian asymmetric challenges such as economic manipulation, an extensive and powerful disinformation and propaganda
campaign, the fostering of civil disobedience and even insurrection and
the use of well-supplied paramilitaries. In sum, Russian hybrid warfare
as widely understood in the West represents a method of operating that
relies on proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution and intent, and
to maximize confusion and uncertainty. Conventional force is often
obliquely mentioned as a supplementary feature, but the main feature
1      See, for instance, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Financial Times, August 28, 2014.
G. Lasconjarias and J. Larsen, eds., NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats (Rome: NATO Defense
College, 2015), brings many of these views represented in the debate together into one volume. For one of the first, also see M. Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Nonlinear Warfare,” July 6, 2014 https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the
-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war.
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of hybrid warfare is that it remains below the threshold of the clear use
of armed force. Hybrid warfare is thus tantamount to a range of hostile
actions of which military force is only a small part, or “measures short of
war” that seek to deceive, undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize
societies, to coerce or replace sovereign governments and to disrupt or
alter an existing regional order.
Such definitions almost invariably draw on parts of Gerasimov’s
article, in which he does indeed state that the “role of non-military
means has grown and in many cases exceeded the power of force of
weapons in their effectiveness.” He also points to the important roles
of special operations forces and “internal opposition to create a permanently operational front through the entire territory of the enemy state,”
and the blurring of the lines between war and peace. And of course
Gerasimov’s article is an important source for understanding Russian
thinking, particularly the efforts of the Russian leadership to adapt to
warfare in the 21st century, rather than harking back to an earlier period
and a return to the Cold War, and how the Russian military has sought
to learn how to neutralize the West’s “overwhelming conventional military superiority.”2
At the same time, the term hybrid warfare has been rigorously critiqued by some in the Russia-watching community, as well as those in
the wider strategic studies field. The main criticisms of hybrid warfare
are worth briefly summarizing in four points.3 First, the term hybrid
warfare is not new, indeed it has a long history, and in many ways is
best understood as warfare. In relation to Russia, the term is often used
without an awareness of historical context. The term, as one observer
has pointed out, has “drifted far afield from its inventor’s original objective, which was to raise awareness of threats that cannot be defeated
solely by the employment of airpower and special forces.” Thus the term
serves to cloud thinking.4
Second, the term hybrid warfare—as intended as a label for Russian
actions—does not relate to Russian conceptions of warfare. While many
purport to explain Russian conceptualizations of hybrid warfare, its
appeal to the Russian leadership and the conditions in which Moscow
might deploy such an approach, they do so without either Russian language sources or detailed, empathetic consideration of the view from
Moscow, and the Russian leadership’s actual approach and the considerable difficulties it faces.5 A Russian strategy is thus asserted and assumed,
apparently being made in a vacuum, and without all the problems that
strategists everywhere face.
Moreover, Russian commentators use the term gibridnaya voina, a
direct transliteration of hybrid warfare, when they assert that the notion

2      V. Gerasimov, “Tsennost Nauki v Predvidenniye,” Voenno-promyshlenni Kurier, February 27,
2013, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.
3      Three good critiques are K. Giles, What’s Russian for Hybrid Warfare? (Carlisle, PA: US Army
War College, forthcoming, 2016); C. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review (JanuaryFebruary 2016); S. Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid Warfare,” Survival 57, no. 6 (December-January
2016).
4      A. Echevarria, “Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for US Military
Strategy,” Strategic Studies Institute, 2016.
5      Empathy, it should be remembered, is not synonymous with sympathy.
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of Russian hybrid warfare is a myth.6 Russian officials are emphatic that
“hybrid warfare” is not a Russian concept, but a Western one, indeed
that is something that the West is currently waging on Russia. This suggests that there is insufficient connection between what the West thinks
it sees in Russian actions and how the Russians themselves conceive
them, and consequently that the Western discussion of Russia is both
abstract and misleading. This is an important reason for the strong sense
of surprise in the West about Russian actions.
Third, related to this, the way Gerasimov’s article has been used
in attempting to understand Russian actions in Ukraine and potential
threats to NATO is problematic. The article, an attempt to frame a
conceptual response to the complex situation that emerged with the socalled Arab Spring, and grasp how warfare had evolved since the end
of the Cold War, and particularly in the twenty-first century, is often
pulled out of this context. Indeed, in large part the article reflected a
series of longer-term views that had already been taking shape under
Gerasimov’s predecessor, Nikolai Makarov, Russian Chief of General
Staff from 2008 to 2012. Of course, this had important implications for
how Russia understood and operated in Crimea and the war in Ukraine.
But the point is that Gerasimov’s article was a response to developments
elsewhere, and the perceived evolution of war fighting as led by others,
particularly Western militaries.
Moreover, only some conveniently relevant lines of the article are
used in the hybrid analysis: important themes in the article are often
overlooked, as are Gerasimov’s other statements, and strategic planning
documents such as the military doctrine and foreign policy concept.
Thus, while the article is important and revealing, much relevant material is missed in the Western discussion, giving an inaccurate indication
of how Russian military thinking and capacity is changing.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the label hybrid warfare
anchors analysis to what took place in February 2014 in Crimea, even
as conditions—and Russian actions—have been changing. Indeed, the
hybrid label serves to draw a veil over the conventional aspects of the war
in Eastern Ukraine. While non-military means of power were deployed,
they relied on more traditional conventional measures for their success.
This was amply demonstrated in the battles at Debaltsevo, Donbass
airport and Ilovaisk, during which much of the fighting involved high
intensity combat, including the extensive use of armor, artillery and
multiple launch rocket systems, as well as drones and electronic warfare.
During these battles, massed bombardments were deployed to considerable lethal effect—in short but intense bombardments battalion sized
units were rendered inoperable, suffering heavy casualties.
Additionally, by continuing to focus on the supposed hybrid aspects
of Russian operations, it overlooks the evolution of Russian military
thinking and the centrality of conventional force in it. Indeed, the ability
to develop and deploy such conventional capability has only become
more obvious, exemplified by Russia’s intervention in the war in Syria.
Beginning in late September 2015, the scale and impact of Russian force
deployed in this war has been significant: in December 2015, human
6      See, for instance, R. Pukhov, “Mif o ‘Gibridnoi voine’” [The Myth of ‘Hybrid Warfare’],
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 29, 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html.
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rights groups in Syria accused Russia of killing more than 2,300 people,
including hundreds of civilians, in indiscriminate attacks that involved
the use of vacuum bombs, unguided or “dumb” bombs and cluster
munitions.7
While Russian officials rejected these accusations as “absurd” and
a “hoax,” the statements of senior Russian defense officials themselves
do illustrate the scale of the force deployed at tactical, operational and
strategic levels. Thousands of tactical and operational sorties have been
flown, striking hundreds of targets. At the same time, in support of the
forces deployed to Syria, Russia has launched strategic strikes. These
have included cruise missile strikes from long-range Tu-160, Tu-195MS
and Tu-22M3 bombers launched from Russia, and also cruise missile
attacks launched from surface vessels in the Caspian Sea and from
submarines in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the Russian authorities themselves emphasize the scale and the strategic nature of the force they
are seeking to deploy: supplementing “high intensity” operations with
“massive” strategic air raids, delivering “powerful strikes” across Syria’s
territory.8 In Putin’s terms, Russia has conducted a “comprehensive
application of force...allowing [Russia] qualitatively to change the situation in Syria,” and a “great deal has been done over the course of the
past year to expand the potential of our armed forces.. and Russia has
reached a new level of operational use of its troops, with a high readiness
among units.”9
This should be seen in the context of other aspects of the evolution
of Russian military capability. A prolonged and deep series of reforms
to the military has been underway since the Russo-Georgia war in 2008.
A major feature of this has been a substantial spending program of 20
trillion rubles (approximately $640 billion when it was signed off in
2010) dedicated to modernizing the armed forces by 2020, including
ensuring that 70 percent of the armed forces’ weapons are modern, and
the acquisition of 400 ICBMs and SLBMs, 20 attack submarines, 50
combat surface ships, 700 modern fighter aircraft, and more than 2,000
tanks and 2,000 self-propelled and tracked guns. Although there are
some problems in achieving these targets, Russian officials state that by
the end of 2015, 30 percent of weapons were new (more in some areas)
and this should reach 50 percent by the end of 2016. Thus, while hybrid
aspects are important, as one American observer has accurately stated,
“while the US military is cutting back on heavy conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a similar future operational environment, and
doubling down on hers.”10
At the same time, the forces themselves have been learning how
strategically to deploy conventional capability. A Russian naval flotilla
was deployed to the waters off Northern Australia during the G20 in late
2014, for instance, indicative of the type of deployment that is likely to
become more frequent, and the Russian ground forces have undergone
7      Amnesty International, Civilian Objects Were Not Damaged: Russia’s Statements on Its Attacks in
Syria Unmasked (London: Amnesty International, December 2015), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/
sites/default/files/civilian_objects_were_not_damaged.pdf.
8      “Soveshaniye o deistviyakh Vooruzhonnikh Sil Rossii v Sirii” [Meeting on Russia’s Armed
Forces Actions in Syria], November 17, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50714.
9      “Rasshirennoe zasedaniye kollegi Ministerstva oboroni” [Expanded Meeting of the Defense
Ministry Board], December 11, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50913.
10      Bartles, 36-37.
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constant exercising at all levels over the last five years.11 As one astute
observer has suggested, these exercises have sought to address questions of both quality and quantity of equipment and servicemen, and
were in the main about fighting large-scale interstate war. Thus, by 2015,
“Russia had been preparing its armed forces for a regional confrontation with possible escalation into using nuclear weapons for at least four
years.” The Russian Armed Forces were “most likely capable of launching large-scale conventional high-intensity offensive joint inter-service
operations, or … to put it simply, to conduct big war-fighting operations with
big formations.” Furthermore, each of the exercises during this period
demonstrated ambitions to increase Russia’s military power, and were
conducted in coordination with other agencies, suggesting that the
focus was not just the fighting ability of the armed forces, but improving
the state’s capacity to wage war.12

Re-reading Gerasimov – War Fighting in the 21st Century

With this in mind, it is worth reflecting again on Gerasimov’s article
and the so-called “Gerasimov doctrine,” particularly in the context of
other statements by the Russian Chief of Staff and other senior officials.
Four points deserve attention.
First, if it is true that the article points to the increasing importance
of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals, it also
emphasizes the ramifications of these means—which reveals rather
different concerns. According to Gerasimov, the lessons of the Arab
Spring are that if the “rules of war” have changed, the consequences have
not – the results of the “colored revolutions” are that a “thriving state
can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of
fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention and sink into
a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war.” “In terms of
the scale of casualties and destruction… such new-type conflicts are
comparable with the consequences of any real war.” The Russian armed
forces therefore need to have a “clear understanding of the forms and
methods of the use and application of force.”13 This corresponds to
the statements by other senior Russian officials about how hybrid-type
conflicts can evolve and merge—and draw states into interstate wars
that then undermine them. Russian armed forces need to be able both
to fight that “fierce armed conflict” and also shut out potential “foreign
intervention.”
Second, in the article, Gerasimov went beyond discussing “color
revolution-type” conflicts, and also reflected on military power projection and strategic war fighting. Noting piracy, the September 2012 attack
on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the hostage taking in Algeria, he
stated the need for a system of armed defense of the interests of the state
beyond the borders of its territory.
He also reflected on American concepts of “Global Strike” and
“global missile defense” which “foresee the defeat of enemy objects and
11      Led by the flagship of the Russian Pacific fleet, the Varyag, a Slava-class cruiser, the group
was a small but self-sustainable ocean-going flotilla.
12      J. Norberg, Training to Fight. Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011-2014 (Stockholm: FOI,
December 2015): 61-2. Emphasis added.
13      Gerasimov, op cit. Emphasis added.
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forces in a matter of hours from almost any point on the globe, while at
the same time ensuring the prevention of unacceptable harm from an
enemy counterstrike.” Similarly, he pointed to US deployment of highly
mobile, mixed-type groups of forces. This suggests that the Russian
leadership is deliberating on how to deal with a range of threats that
involve the strategic deployment of armed force, including major strikes
on Russia and its interests that clearly go well beyond a hybrid nature.
This relates closely to other statements by Gerasimov which point to
his concern about the increasing possibility of armed conflict breaking
out and threatening Russia. In early 2013—at the same time, roughly,
as his article—he also suggested that Russia may be drawn into military
conflicts as powers vie for resources, many of which are in Russia or
its immediate neighborhood. Thus by 2030, “the level of existing and
potential threats will significantly increase” as “powers struggle for fuel,
energy and labour resources, as well as new markets in which to sell their
goods.” Given such conditions, some “powers will actively use their
military potential,” he thought.14
Again, this corresponds to concerns stated by senior figures about
increasing international instability, competition and even war. President
Putin, for instance, has stated that the lessons of history suggest that
“changes in the world order, and what we’re seeing today are events on
this scale, have usually been accompanied if not by global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive low-level conflicts,” and “today we see
a sharp increase in the likelihood of a whole set of violent conflicts with
either the direct or indirect participation by the world’s major powers.”
Risks, he suggested, included not just internal instability in states, but
traditional multinational conflicts.15 Subsequently, he suggested that the
“potential for conflict in the world is growing, old contradictions are
growing ever more acute and new ones are being provoked.”16 These
points about the perceived need for force projection to defend interests,
and concerns about the potential for conflict and even strategic strikes
on Russia and its interests are what underpin both the major modernisation programme of the armed forces, the ongoing prioritization of the
maintenance and modernisation Russia’s strategic nuclear capacity and
the significant investments in the high north.
Third, a central theme underpinning Gerasimov’s article is readiness.
At the outset, he suggests that in the twenty-first century, we have seen a
tendency towards blurring the lines between the states of war and peace.
Wars are no longer declared. Yet as he himself states at the end of the
article, this is not new: he quotes the Soviet military theoretician Georgy
Isserson, who stated before the second world war broke out that “war in
general is not declared, it simply begins with already developed military
forces.” This is at the heart of the wider Russian approach to international affairs today: the concern about the speed with which conflict
and war erupts and evolves, and therefore the need to be prepared for
multiple eventualities in the name of defending the state and its interests
at a moment’s notice. He quoted Isserson in stating “mobilisation and
14      Cited in “Russia may be Drawn into Resources Wars in Future – Army Chief,” Russia Today,
February 14, 2013, https://www.rt.com/politics/military-conflict-gerasimov-threat-196.
15      “Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnovo Diskussionnovo kluba ‘Valdai’,” October 24, 2014.
16      “Soveshaniye poslov i postoyannikh predstavitelei Rossii,” July 1, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/46131.
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concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of
war, as in 1914, but rather unnoticed, proceeds long before that.” This
corresponds not only with other statements made by Gerasimov and
others since early 2013, but with the exercises about moving Russia onto
a war footing, in effect state mobilisation to prepare to withstand the
test of war.

Beyond Russian “Hybridity” Towards Russian Mobilization

The labels hybrid war and Gerasimov doctrine have served an
important purpose—it has energized debate about evolving Russian
power and the range of tools at Moscow’s disposal, particularly highlighting the role of information and strategic communication. And it
emphasizes the need for better coordination between NATO and the
European Union. But at the same time, these labels illuminate only a
specific part of what is a much larger evolving puzzle.
And there is a danger that the label is no longer encouraging thinking about Russia, but becoming an unchallengeable artifice: senior
Western officials have noted that there is little point in questioning the
concept of hybrid warfare because “that ship has sailed.” If this is true,
and hybrid warfare has become an orthodox label, then the Alliance will
face encroaching mental arthritis at the very moment that it needs to be
most adaptable to a changing environment—and in consequence will
suffer repeated unpleasant surprises. As another experienced Western
official noted, the focus on hybridity in 2014 and 2015 meant that too
few were looking at Russian strategic power, and thus were taken by
surprise by Russia’s deployment of complex and massive cruise missile
strikes on Syria. Thus, if the hybrid “ship has sailed” in the NATO
debate, it should beware of icebergs and torpedoes. To avoid such perils,
it is time to move on from thinking about hybrid warfare, and towards
understanding the implications of the much deeper and wider Russian
state mobilization.
Two conclusions flow from this. First, the Russian armed forces are
in a period of experimentation and learning. Russian military thinking is
rapidly evolving, absorbing lessons from its exercises, events in Ukraine,
the war in Syria and how the West is responding to the situation. Indeed,
an important undercurrent in Gerasimov’s article was the posing of
questions—“What is modern war? What should the army be prepared
for? How should it be armed? Which strategic operations are necessary and how many will we need in the future?” This reflects a lengthy
and ongoing debate within the Russian military about the nature of war
and how best to defend Russian interests in an increasingly competitive
international environment. Such debates appear to include questions
about the need for constant readiness forces and the requirements for
short or longer war fighting, the role of reserves in successfully enduring a longer war, and about Western military capacities. Thus neither
Russian capabilities and thinking about war are static, both are evolving
quite rapidly.
This is not to suggest that after years of underinvestment and
neglect the Russian armed forces have suddenly become invincible. They
continue to face numerous problems. But while some Western military
observers are painting a picture of a “2030 future” in which Russia has
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developed a “new generation” warfare, one in which Russian ground
forces would rely on massive salvoes of precision rocket and artillery
fire, targeted by UAVs and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities
designed to blind NATO, we do not have to look as far ahead as 2030
to see precisely that capacity taking shape.17 This emphasizes the point
that the Western understanding of the evolution of Russian military,
already playing catch-up in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
should not fall behind either (let alone both) of the twin Russian curves
of re-equipment and lesson learning.
Second, the gaps in how the West and Moscow are addressing the
similar future operating environment are notable. Perhaps the most
important element of this gap is in the approaches to “asymmetry.” In
NATO, this has been understood as Russia adopting other, non-conventional means to attempt to off-set Western conventional superiority. It
appears, however, that Russian thinking about asymmetry is different,
and can include a conventional military superiority in a specific place
and at a certain time. Western forces have gained much experience in
Iraq and Afghanistan of a specific kind of combat. But the examples of
what has happened in Eastern Ukraine, and subsequently in Syria—and
what exercises suggest that Russian armed forces are preparing for—are
instructive in terms of understanding conventional asymmetry.
To be sure, there is some recognition of this changing picture of
Russia. Senior US and other allied officials and generals have noted this
Russian conventional capacity and how it might have a negative impact
on NATO and allied forces, noting, for instance, Russian anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Furthermore, in early 2016, the United
States announced a quadrupling of its military spending in Europe over
a two-year period as part of what Defense Secretary Carter stated was
a “strong and balanced” approach to reassure Eastern European allies
and to deter Russian aggression. “We must demonstrate to potential foes
that if they start a war, we have the capacity to win,” he said.
But there are other implications for US defense policy that bear
reflection, since the US bears the heaviest burden of NATO’s Article
V guarantee when it comes to conventional warfighting capacity. Two
points stand out, military and conceptual. The military implications particularly relate to the necessary equipment for such an environment. Not
all NATO forces are equipped for engagements in which light armored
vehicles are vulnerable to massive, intense fire strikes and in which cyber
and electronic warfare plays a central role in affecting command and
control; indeed, NATO’s electronic warfare capacity has withered over
years, while Russia has developed its capacity, and NATO also appears
to be struggling with how to address cyber threats at both policy and
implementation levels. This needs sustained attention.
The conceptual point is perhaps more important. Russia has not
been a feature of US defense thinking for 25 years. While it hardly needs
saying that much has changed, it is worth noting that during this time,
in other conflicts, it has sometimes appeared that US and allied combat
superiority has been so marked that the active role of an opponent has
17      P. Norwood and B. Jensen, “Three Offsets for American Landpower
Dominance,” War on the Rocks, November 23, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/
three-offsets-for-american-landpower-dominance.
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been overlooked, that the point that the opponent has a vote has been
forgotten. The point about recalibrating away from hybrid warfare—
while keeping in mind what has been learnt over the last couple of years
—to mobilization is that a better understanding of how and why Russia
goes to war is necessary, as is a more flexible understanding of how the
Russian leadership might view how that war might be fought and won.
It is not clear, for instance, how Western populations would respond
to conventional engagements in which there would be heavy casualties
on both sides, and the ability to endure such a conflict is open to question. In such circumstances, therefore, NATO as a whole, and even the
US itself cannot rely on the automatic assumption that it would win a
conventional war.

